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Abstract 
Professor Charlotte Witt, of the University of New Hampshire, has developed a 
new gender theory that is unique in the contemporary feminist movement. Her gender 
theory rests on a form of essentialism called “uniessentialism.” The primary aim of this 
thesis is to articulate Witt’s theory, and specifically that of uniessentialism, in light of 
Aristotle. Aristotle serves as a foundation for many of Witt’s arguments, including 
essentialism, which will be analyzed. 
This thesis will seek to clarify Witt’s gender theory and enable a reader, in light of 
various perspectives and critiques of her theory, to make a determination on whether her 
theory is coherent. Several analyses on Witt’s gender theory will be presented, including 
contemporary feminist critiques of her position, a critique of biology and sexual difference 
in light of her arguments, an analysis of a traditional understanding of essence, and ending 
with an alternative view of gender from a combined Aristotelian/Thomistic viewpoint. 
The author maintains a neutral position while articulating the theory of Witt and 
Aristotle and the critiques in the final chapter. However, with respect to Witt’s theory, the 
author’s biases include disagreement on the reality of sexual difference, disagreement on 
her explanation of personhood and the social individual, and disagreement about 
essentialism and the constitution view. The author holds a traditional 
Aristotelian/Thomistic understanding of philosophy. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Recently, several news stories concerning sex and gender have become national 
headlines. Such stories are challenging the way society looks at sex and gender, often 
changing preconceived notions. It has also led to claims of bigotry and discrimination by 
those who hold a traditional understanding. One example of such a story is a current federal 
court case concerning a child diagnosed with gender dysphoria.1 The local school board in 
Gloucester County, Virginia prevented the child (Gavin Grimm) from utilizing the 
bathroom of his chosen gender, feminine.2 The case is still working its way through the 
court system. However, the case highlights serious issues that affect society’s 
understanding of gender and its relation to biological sex – in some cases even asking 
whether biological sex exists. Gender theory has also worked its way into local and state 
law. Currently, New York City has a gender enforcement guide; the city can fine violators 
found guilty up to $125,000 for violations, and up to $250,000 for violations that are the 
result of “willful, wanton, or malicious conduct.”3  
  
                                                 
1 Gender dysphoria is defined by the American Psychiatric Association as “a conflict between a 
person’s physical or assigned gender and the gender with which he/she/they identify.” Ranna Parekh, “What 
Is Gender Dysphoria?” accessed 4/12/2018. http://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-
dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5) 
details the specific criteria for diagnosis. 
2 G.G. (Gavin Grimm v. Gloucester County School Board (United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, 2016). 
3 New York City Commission on Human Rights, “Gender Identity/Gender Expression: Legal 
Enforcement Guidance,” accessed 12/27/2017. http://www1.nyc.gov/site/cchr/law/legal-guidances-gender-
identity-expression.page. 
2 
 
1.1 Gender Wars 
At its most fundamental philosophical foundation, the debate about gender is a 
debate between realism and nominalism. One side includes those who hold a position that 
sex and gender are not distinct aspects of a human being, but are interconnected (realists). 
The traditional notion of sex and gender believes that sex is a biological reality. The realists 
oppose the notion that gender is fluid or that a person can change their biological sex. 
Regarding the aforementioned court case, their position analyzes it as follows: 
Transgender ideology instructs that the body does not reveal the person; the 
mind does. Except that the mind is invisible, and so reveals nothing. The 
pragmatic need of gender-identity dissenters from sex, then, is a mechanism 
by which the mind’s determination may be made visible. This need is 
ordinarily met by such persons’ adopting the appearance, fashion, and 
practices associated with male or female bodies, in a display intended either 
to conform to or confound those physical categories—but in either event 
relying on the social authority of the categories and the visible cues and 
institutions reflecting them. . . . While aiming to replace sex with gender 
identity, Gavin [the plaintiff] insists on access to the male facilities that exist 
only because the public acknowledges the meaningfulness of bodies that 
she denies have meaning. Her novel theory of identity and her claim for 
restroom access are mutually refuting [emphasis mine].4 
The other side comprises those who believe that sex and gender are merely labels, 
and are not essential to human individuals. They believe that sex and gender terms are 
relative and nominal. They contend that gender is fluid and not necessarily the same as 
one’s biological sex. Many would assert that even biological sex is fluid and merely a label. 
Several communities and organizations hold this position, including many in the Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual, and Transsexual (LGBT) community. Other communities, such as the 
                                                 
4 Jeff Shafer, “Supreme Incoherence: Transgender Ideology and the End of Law,” First Things, 
accessed 11/8/2107. https://www.firstthings.com/web-exclusives/2017/03/supreme-incoherence-
transgender-ideology-and-the-end-of-law. 
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Democratic Party,5 the National Center for Transgender Equality, the Human Rights 
Campaign (HRC), Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) offically 
believe the same.6 They argue that: 
Gender identity is a person’s inner sense of belonging to a particular gender. 
It is an innate, deeply felt, and core component of human identity that is 
fixed at an early age. At birth, infants are as [sic] assigned an identity of 
male or female based on a cursory observation of their external genitalia. 
That identification is then recorded on the person’s birth certificate. 
Everyone has a gender identity, and for most people, their gender identity 
is consistent with their sex assigned at birth. Transgender people, however, 
have a gender identity that is different from the sex they were identified as, 
or assumed to be, at birth.7 
1.2 Society Divided 
Society is currently engaged in a divisive debate about a fundamental aspect of the 
human being: sexual difference. Should sexual difference be understood as an objective 
and fixed aspect of reality not subject to emotivism or preference? For most of human 
history, there was no distinction between sex and gender. Fast-forward to the 21st century, 
and the debate is now challenging fundamental understandings, even reconsidering 
whether biological sex is a reality.  
If sex and gender are not objective, then should sex and gender be considered 
subjective and relative, based on an inner sense of who one is as an individual? What is the 
                                                 
5 Democratic National Committee, “The 2016 Democratic Platform,” accessed 4/12/2018. 
https://www.democrats.org/party-platform. 
6 Anna Brown, “Republicans, Democrats Have Starkly Different Views on Transgender Issues,” 
Pew Research Center, accessed 3/9/2018. http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/08/transgender-
issues-divide-republicans-and-democrats/. The Pew Research Center conducted a study in 2017 which 
determined that 64% of Democrats believe that sex at birth does not determine an individual’s sex. The poll 
also showed that the “Millennial” generation (aged 18-36) believe this, and as compared to previous 
generations, shows between a 9% to 13% increase in support of this view. 
7 G.G. v. Gloucester County School Board Brief for the World Professional Association for 
Transgender Health et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent. Supreme Court of the United States, 
2017, 6. 
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difference between the two terms, if any? Even the terms associated with the arguments 
cause further misunderstandings. When “sex” and “gender” are used interchangeably and 
loosely, or the definitions are not agreed upon prior to a debate, it causes even greater 
confusion. Answering these questions and questions like it will help provide society with 
a clear understanding of the issue, enabling them to make informed decisions. 
Much of the discussion is taking place within the feminist and LGBT communities. 
Their arguments vary, often motivated by the political desire to restore fairness and 
equality between men and women or to extend rights to those who claim that they do not 
fit a particular gender. LGBT members who question their gender have a vested interest in 
the matter. The approval or disapproval of their political movement by society depends on 
their being accepted as their self-identified gender. Thus, the understanding of sex and 
gender as either subjective or objective is critical. 
1.3 Charlotte Witt and Aristotle 
Philosophers are also engaged in the debate, often in an attempt to reinterpret or 
explain what previous philosophers have left behind and hopefully to build on a solid 
foundation previously laid. Charlotte Witt, a professor of philosophy at the University of 
New Hampshire, has devised an intriguing theory of gender that is insightful for how it 
goes about answering the questions of sex and gender. She calls her theory “gender 
uniessentialism.” Her position is unique in that she attempts to reconcile current theories 
of gender with the metaphysics of Aristotle.  
Witt claims to have devised an Aristotelian inspired theory of gender, which raises 
several questions: What is Aristotle’s understanding of sex and gender? His positions are 
varied, coming from his biological understanding, yet also from his metaphysical analysis. 
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How does Aristotle define essence? Essence is a crucial aspect of Witt’s theory, and as 
such an understanding of Aristotle will help clarify her theory.  
Witt’s theory is controversial, both for contemporary feminism as well as for 
Aristotelians. Witt’s primary audience is the feminist community, and they have responded 
negatively. Feminists largely reject any sort of essence regarding gender. The feminist 
position often finds itself in a dilemma. When they reject essentialism, they destroy the 
very concept of “woman” which they seek to advocate. If they accept that there is an 
essence, it can potentially exclude some women from the group “woman.” Witt’s position 
appears to solve the dilemma by making gender essential in a way that would not exclude 
some women from the group. However, Witt’s fellow feminist Ann Cudd offers a detailed 
critique of Witt’s system that merits consideration.  
The Aristotelian academic community is less engaged with Witt’s gender theory 
and more concerned with her underlying theory of essence – uniessentialism. Aristotelians 
might argue that she does not go far enough, that her essentialism (as will be explained in 
Chapter Three) is only part of Aristotle’s understanding of essence. A comparison of her 
theory with that of Aristotle will help determine whether her theory of essence is 
compatible with Aristotle, and whether it serves as a worthy advancement of his 
metaphysical system.  
Finally, a differing view of gender that is Aristotelian, one offered by John Finley, 
can help highlight the areas of debate.  Finley provides an account of gender as traditionally 
understood, yet advances both Aristotle’s and St. Thomas Aquinas’ views of how sexual 
difference originates, as an accident of the form rather than that of matter.  Finley’s view 
6 
 
is an example of a traditional account of sex and gender that highlights differences in Witt 
and others, especially in the use of essence. 
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Chapter Two: Aristotle, Sex, and Essentialism 
Witt’s position, uniessentialism, is based in part on Aristotle’s metaphysics. It is 
necessary to examine various concepts that Aristotle uses in his philosophy, as Witt uses 
them while defending her argument. Another key consideration is Aristotle’s notion of 
essence, as it is the foundation for Witt’s argument. Aristotle’s understanding of sex and 
gender play an important role and will be examined. Understanding his system will help 
clarify Witt’s theory and her assertion that it is Aristotelian. 
2.1 Terminology 
Gender theory is often problematic to discuss because the terminology used is 
inadequately defined or used inconsistently. Philosophers, reporters, and medical 
professionals alike mean different things when talking about terms like sex and gender. 
Often, the meaning of philosophical terms such as essence and substance are not clearly 
articulated, or they are redefined from one philosopher to the next. A solid base of defined 
terminology is needed to ensure a consistent use of the terms. Once the terminology is 
adequately defined, the problems, confusions, and debates concerning gender theory are 
clarified and become evident. Whenever these terms deviate from Aristotle’s definition or 
are modified, such modifications will be identified to ensure a proper understanding of the 
manner in which Witt and Aristotle employ them. The terminology used will be primarily 
Aristotelian unless stated otherwise.8 
                                                 
8 Where Witt’s theory is discussed, her terminology will be used. Later in the critique, any issues 
that arise due to terminology will be evaluated. 
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2.1.1 Properties and Accident 
Properties and accidents are also known as predicables - which also include genus, 
species, and specific difference, - in that they can be predicated of a thing. The difference 
between a property and accident lies in the necessity of its application to a subject.  
Aristotle defines accident as: 
something which . . . belongs to the thing; and something which may either 
belong or not belong to any one and the self-same thing, as (e.g.) being 
seated may belong or not belong to some self-same thing. Likewise also 
whiteness, for there is nothing to prevent the same thing being at one time 
white and another not white.9 
Aristotle defines property as: 
A property is something which does not indicate the essence of a thing, but 
yet belongs to that thing alone, and is predicated convertibly of it. Thus it is 
a property of man to be capable of learning grammar, and if he is capable 
of learning grammar, he is a man.10 
W. Baumgaertner states that a property “may indicate something outside the 
essence but necessarily following it.”11 As Patrick Rooney defines it, for a particular 
predicable to be a property, it has to meet two conditions: “(1) the predicate applies to all 
instances [emphasis mine] of the subject term, and conversely, the subject term can be 
predicated of all instances of the predicate; and (2) the predicate is not essential.”12  
                                                 
9 Aristotle, “Topics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. 
Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 102b 1-10. 
10 Ibid., 102a 15-25. 
11 W. Baumgaertner, “Predicables,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia (Detroit: Gale, 2003), 659-60. 
12 Patrick J. Rooney, “Philosophy, Technical Terms in: Property,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia 
Supplement 2012-2013: Ethics and Philosophy, ed. Robert L. Fastiggi (Detroit: Gale, 2013), 1194. 
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Accidents do not satisfy the first condition, and are contingently associated with the 
subject. For example, while risibility is a property of a rational animal, having blue as an 
eye color is an accident as it is not applicable to all humans.  
2.1.2 Causality 
Causality refers to a relationship between a cause, or source of action, and an effect, 
the consequence of the action. Aristotle defined four types of causes: formal, material, 
efficient, and final, each answering “why” in a different respect. A material cause is “that 
out of which a thing comes to be and persists.”13 A formal cause is “the form or archetype, 
that is, the statement of the essence.”14 An efficient or agent cause is the “primary source 
of the change or coming to rest.”15 The final cause is “in the sense of end [sic] or that for 
the sake of which a thing is done.”16 Thus a cause is a principle to which there is a relation 
of dependence. 
2.1.3 Person 
There are many definitions of persons depending on context. However, a person in 
scholastic terms (not Aristotelian) is “any individual [primary substance] of a rational 
nature.”17 Aristotle defines man as a “rational animal,” but does not seem to make a further 
                                                 
13 Aristotle, “Physics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 194b 
20-35. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Leonard William Geddes, Willam Augustine Wallace, and Joseph W. Koterski, “Person (in 
Scholastic Philosophy),” in New Catholic Encyclopedia Supplement 2012-2013: Ethics and Philosophy, ed. 
Robert L. Fastiggi (Detroit: Gale, 2013), 1131. 
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definition. Traditionally, five notes make up a person: it is a substance, it is a complete 
nature, it is subsistent by itself, it is separated from others, and it is of a rational nature.18 
2.1.4 Sex 
“Sex” and the following term, “gender” are the most controversial terms to define, 
as any definition given supposes a particular mindset within the various gender theories. 
Whereas Christian anthropology uses these terms interchangeably, secular culture and 
other philosophers of gender such as Witt will differentiate between sex as a biological 
reality and gender as a societal role.19 Traditionally (not Aristotelian), sex is defined 
biologically as “a differentiation that occurs in animals of the higher types and renders each 
individual either male or female.”20 Some particular concerns arise when dealing with birth 
defects which result from differing chromosomal patterns, or abnormalities during fetal 
development that can result in intersex persons or hermaphrodites.21 These situations are 
rare yet challenging. It becomes especially important in determining under what societal 
or cultural norms to raise a child whose sex cannot be adequately determined. Aristotle’s 
understanding of sexual difference is detailed in the following sections. 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Mary Shivanandan, and Mark S. Latkovic, “Sex,” in New Catholic 
Encyclopedia Supplement 2012-2013: Ethics and Philosophy, ed. Robert L. Fastiggi (Detroit: Gale, 2013), 
1405. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Biological abnormalities such as intersex and hermaphrodite individuals will be discussed in 
Chapter Four as it relates to Witt’s understanding of sexual difference. 
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2.1.5 Gender 
Gender builds upon the understanding of sex and is broadly defined as the way in 
which a human person exists.22 However, it is not any way that a person exists, but in 
relation to sex. Gender terminology typically uses masculine and feminine as well as man 
and woman in relation to the biological sex of male and female. Philosophers such as Judith 
Butler “assert that both gender, understood as ‘culturally determined,’ and one’s biological 
sex are mutable.”23 Proponents of a traditional view object to Butler’s assertion, insisting 
that the two are intrinsically tied to one another, even if it is accepted that they are distinct. 
Aristotle never referred to gender, as his understanding of sexual difference was purely 
biological. 
In many ways gender can be accidental (i.e. contingent to the subject), such as 
differing social or cultural norms (often referred to as gender norms). One example of this 
is the type of clothing that males would wear as opposed to females. In such a distinction, 
a masculine trait might be the wearing of pants rather than a skirt, which might be 
characteristically feminine in a particular society.  
On the other hand, some characteristics are derived from the sex of the person. Such 
characteristics could include the potentiality of fatherhood and motherhood inherent in all 
healthy men or women. Further, fatherhood or motherhood could be combined with other 
accidental qualities of gender, such as how the particular role of fatherhood is played out 
in a particular society (e.g., a father in one society might teach his son how to hunt, while 
in another how to manage finances). Yet biological fatherhood is intrinsically tied to a male 
                                                 
22 J. Marianne Siegmund, “Gender, Philosophy of,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia Supplement 
2012-2013: Ethics and Philosophy, ed. Robert L. Fastiggi (Detroit: Gale, 2013), 614. 
23 Ibid. 
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as biological motherhood is to a female. A woman cannot be a father, nor experience 
fatherhood, even while having the ability to teach certain aspects or actions (such as a 
woman teaching her son how to hunt). Certain biological powers exist only in a male or 
only in a female. 
2.1.6 Essence and Substance 
Essence and substance are closely related in Aristotle’s works. It is difficult to 
speak of one without the other. In many places, they are used interchangeably and are 
equated with one another. Aristotle outlines the various opinions on what essence and 
substance are in Metaphysics Z. In Z.2, Aristotle presents four options: 
The word ‘substance’ [emphasis mine] is applied, if not in more senses, still 
at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal and the 
genus are thought to be the substance [emphasis mine] of each thing, and 
fourthly the substratum. Now the substratum is that of which other things 
are predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else . . . that which 
underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance.24 
In Metaphysics Z.3, One Aristotle states that essence is: 
the essence of each thing is what it is said to be in virtue of itself. For being 
you is not being musical; for you are not musical in virtue of yourself. What 
then, you are in virtue of yourself is your essence.25  
In Aristotle’s work Categories, he describes substance as the fundamental category 
of being, along with nine other categories (accidents such as quality, quantity, etc.) which 
are predicated of substance. Importantly, a substance exists in itself, whereas the other 
categories of being exist within a substance, such as “whiteness” existing in a white human 
being. A substance, according to Aristotle, is: 
                                                 
24 Aristotle, “Metaphysics” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 
1028b 30-35. 
25 Ibid, 1029b 10-15. 
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that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual 
man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called 
substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the genera of 
these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, 
and animal is a genus of the species; so these – both man and animal – are 
called secondary substances.26 
Aristotle distinguishes between a primary substance, the individual thing, and 
substance in a secondary sense. A secondary substance is an essence, and is “the type to 
which primary substances belong by articulating the essence or whatness that is common 
to each of these individuals.”27 Secondary substances do not exist apart from primary 
substances.28  
Aristotle, speaks of another distinction in substance. He holds that matter and form 
are what make a primary substance be what it is.29 He states that form actually has the 
greater claim to substance because form is actuality while matter is potency.30 Aristotle, in 
On the Soul, describes another possibility that matter, form, and the composite could each 
be called substance, saying: 
We call one genus of beings substance; of this one is matter, which in itself 
is not an individual thing, another is the shape and form according to which 
                                                 
26 Aristotle, “Categories,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 1b 
10-20. 
27 Robert E. McCall and John Goyette, “Substance,” in New Catholic Encyclopedia Supplement 
2012-2013: Ethics and Philosophy, ed. Robert L. Fastiggi (Detroit: Gale, 2013), 1480. 
28 An exception to this according to Thomists would be the human soul, which, as immaterial and 
immortal, can exist apart from its individual substance, and persist after the bodily death of a human being. 
A rational soul exists per se in this understanding, yet still a secondary substance because it is the form of 
the composite human being. 
29 McCall and Goyette, in New Catholic Encyclopedia Supplement 2012-2013: Ethics and 
Philosophy, 1481. 
30 Ibid. 
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something is called an individual thing, and the third what is composed from 
these.31 
The confusion surrounding these terms is responsible for the debates on what 
constitutes essence and substance in Aristotelian circles, and how they are similar and 
different. These debates result in several views, all claiming to be a form of essentialism.32 
The medieval problem of universals finds its genesis in Aristotle due to the ambiguity 
present.33 What is new is that the problem of universals is now affecting the understanding 
of gender. It is important to note by way of introduction that Witt will argue that for her 
theory, essence is found only in the individual (primary substance), and rejects the notion 
of secondary substance (i.e., kind essentialism). Witt uses that specific understanding of 
essence as her sole notion of essence when she develops her theory. 
2.2 Aristotle on Sexual Difference 
Aristotle’s theory of sexual difference is strictly biological. He addresses the 
difference between men and women in several books, notably in Metaphysics, History of 
Animals, and Generation of Animals. In Aristotle’s writings, there is no mention of gender 
as separated from sex. Aristotle defines male and female on the basis of generation:  
For by a male animal we mean that which generates in another, and by a 
female that which generates in itself; that is why in the macrocosm also, 
                                                 
31 Aristotle, “On the Soul,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 
ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 412a 6-9. 
32 The specifics of the debate will be investigated in Chapter Four. This thesis describes three 
different views that Witt mentions, namely, kind/species essentialism, identity essentialism, and 
uniessentialism. The latter two comprise differing views of individual essentialism. 
33 Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers, 2d ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval 
Studies, 1952), 49. 
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men think of the earth as female and a mother, but address heaven and the 
sun and other like entities as progenitors and fathers.34 
Aristotle further distinguishes based on differing faculties and physical organs: 
Male and female differ in their definition by each having a separate faculty, 
and to perception by certain parts; by definition the male is that which is 
able to generate in another, as said above; the female is that which is able 
to generate in itself and out of which comes into being the offspring 
previously existing in the generator . . . it follows that certain parts must 
exist for union and production of the offspring. And these must differ from 
each other, so that consequently the male will differ from the female . . . . 
Now as a matter of fact such parts are in the female the so-called uterus, in 
the male the testes and the penis.35 
Aristotle describes various attributes that he categorizes as belonging to men or to 
women, some physical, and others emotional or temperamental: 
…the male is larger and longer-lived than the female…Again the female is 
less muscular and less compactly jointed, and more thin and delicate in the 
hair…And the female is more flaccid in texture of flesh, and more knock-
kneed, and the shinbones are thinner. . . .36 Woman is more compassionate 
than man, more easily moved to tears, at the same time is more jealous, 
more querulous, more apt to scold and to strike. . . . As was previously 
stated, the male is more courageous than the female, and more sympathetic 
in the way of standing by to help.37 
Aristotle believes that male and female are contraries within the same species, and 
that in such a pair of contraries, one must be the privation of the other.38 This privation 
“provided the early metaphysical framework for sex polarity,” concluding that a female is 
                                                 
34 Aristotle, “Generation of Animals,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation, 716a 10-15. 
35 Ibid., 716a 20-30. 
36 Aristotle, “History of Animals,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation, 538a 22 - 38b 10. 
37 Ibid., 608b 8. 
38 Prudence Allen, The Concept of Woman, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids, Mi: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing, 
1985), 89. 
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inferior to the male.39 It is important to note that this does not necessarily follow, as other 
Aristotelian philosophers (such as John Finley, introduced in Chapter Four) have shown. 
2.3 Sexual Difference in Matter and Form 
Aristotle believes that all material substances (and as such, men and women) are 
composed of matter and form. In Metaphysics, Aristotle states that “male and female are 
indeed modifications peculiar to ‘animal,’ not however, in virtue of its essence but in the 
matter, i.e. the body.”40 For Aristotle, matter, and not form, determines the sex of an 
individual. He argues that when reproduction occurs, women are the providers of the matter 
of the new human being, while men provide the form. Gareth Matthews describes the 
donation of matter and form by the parents as the “Doctrine of Paternal Agency.”41  
Aristotle thus attempts to explain the process of human reproduction ontologically:42 
The female always provides the material, the male that which fashions it, 
for this is the power that we say they each possess, and this is what it is for 
them to be male and female. Thus while it is necessary for the female to 
provide a body and a material mass, it is not necessary for the male, because 
it is not within what is produced that the tools or the maker must exist. While 
the body is from the female, it is the soul that is from the male, for the soul 
is the substance of a particular body.43  
Moreover: 
                                                 
39 Ibid. 
40 Aristotle, “Metaphysics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 
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41 Gareth B. Matthews, “Gender and Essence in Aristotle,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, 
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42 Allen, 91. 
43 Aristotle, “Generation of Animals,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
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For as we said above, the male and female principles may be put down first 
and foremost as origins of generation, the former as containing the efficient 
cause of generation, the latter the material of it.44 
2.4 Norm-Defect and Complementarity Theory 
Matthews describes two different theories of Aristotle’s sexual difference, the 
“Complementarity Theory” and the “Norm-Defect Theory.”45 The Complementarity 
Theory argues that “there would be a collection of pairs of contrary features . . . such that 
one feature in each pair would go to make up a configuration that is one of two possible 
realisations [sic] of humanity.”46 The Norm-Defect Theory argues that “one of the two 
types is normative, the other, defective.”47 
Both of these theories are seen in Aristotle’s works. The Norm-Defect theory is the 
theory that understandably offends the feminist community. Aristotle clearly believes that 
women are defective and impotent as compared to men, stating that “the female is, as it 
were, a mutilated male,”48 and also: 
Now a boy is like a woman in form, and the woman is, as it were, an 
impotent male, for it is through a certain incapacity that the female is 
female, being incapable of concocting the nutriment in its last stage into 
semen.49 
However, Aristotle also notes the difference between men and women as 
complementary. Matthews cites a portion of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics where 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 716a 5-15. 
45 Matthews,  17-18. 
46 Ibid., 17. 
47 Ibid., 18. 
48 Aristotle, “Generation of Animals,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford 
Translation, 737a 27. 
49 Ibid., 728a 17. 
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Aristotle examines the emotion of grief and the difference in reaction to grief found 
between men and women, stating:  
It seems to me that Aristotle shows at least some fleeting appreciation for 
the possibility of loving sympathizers as ‘friends and companions in 
sorrow.’ But if so, the appreciation is only fleeting. For immediately we are 
admonished to ‘imitate the better type of person.’ . . . Instead of seeing these 
two patterns as complementary patterns of human response to grief, 
Aristotle makes one the norm and the other the defect.50 
While Aristotle does see complementarity in the difference between male and female, he 
sides more often with the Norm-Defect Theory than with the Complementarity Theory.51 
2.5 Prudence Allen’s Three-Phase Approach 
Allen provides a summary of Aristotle’s position by using a three-phase approach, 
distinguishing sex in terms of logic, metaphysics, and philosophy of nature.52 In the first 
phase, logic, Allen states: 
Aristotle’s logic sought the formal essence of the thing being defined. . . . 
Since, for Aristotle, forms did not exist without matter, the essence of 
“man,” or human being, always included some reference to its material 
identity. However, the reference was simply to the presence of a kind of 
materiality common to its classification as animal life. Its difference from 
other animals was defined by the presence of reason. Individuals, as 
examples of primary substances, were instances of the species.53 
At the level of logic, Aristotle defines “man”54 as a rational animal.  
At the metaphysical level, Aristotle questions whether male and female are 
different species; he states:  
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51 Ibid, 18. 
52 Allen, 104-08. 
53 Ibid., 104. 
54 Allen uses “man” here as a term signifying the species, not sex. 
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why a female and male are not different species, though this difference 
belongs to animal [sic] in virtue of its own nature, and not as paleness or 
darkness does; both “female” and “male” belong to it qua animal.55  
Allen considers that Aristotle struggled to explain how two different sexes can be in one 
species, stating that they can be different “1) in form; 2) in matter as contraries in virtue of 
its own nature; or 3) in matter as contraries not belonging to its nature.”56 Male and female 
fall into the second category, as Aristotle believed that the sexual difference was in the 
matter (as previously stated above), but it is not a difference in the form. Citing Aristotle 
as stating “Contraries which are in the definition make a difference in species, but those 
which are in the thing taken as including its matter do not make one [emphasis mine],”57 
Allen argues that Aristotle would say that sex is a necessary accident, as something that: 
belonged to human life qua animal or in virtue of itself. Accident in this 
sense was usually or necessarily present. . . . Therefore, in the Metaphysics, 
sexual differentiation was considered closer to definition of species than 
other differences not present by virtue of the material nature; and sexual 
differences were accidents in a stronger sense than other differences.58 
Lastly, Allen addresses the third phase, the philosophy of nature. Allen states that 
Aristotle uses “sexual distinctions that are necessarily or usually present in woman and 
man.”59 She cites previous passages of Aristotle in Generation of Animals that describe the 
female as passive and the male as active, the female as providing the matter and the man 
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the form, and other previously mentioned differences. These are based in Aristotle’s 
examination of the physical world. 
Allen ends her consideration of the three-phase difference in definition with an 
interesting insight as to how in contemporary times Aristotle’s understanding of gender 
was confused: 
Historically, a wedge was eventually placed between the first and the third 
notion of definition [between logic and the philosophy of nature]. When a 
consideration of the metaphysical category of contraries was dropped from 
western thought, the philosophy of definition slowly but surely became 
identified only with the definition of species or formal nature. 
Consequently, the consideration of material differences between woman 
and man was relegated to the same category of accident as colour of hair 
or skin [emphasis mine]. In contemporary language, this is described as the 
separation of analytic from synthetic predicates, and the preservation of 
only analytic predicates in definitions.60 
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate Allen further in regard to Aristotle 
and definition, her insight might warrant consideration when analyzing Aristotle to better 
understand his theory. 
In conclusion, the language that Aristotle used is often considered offensive today. 
Working with a limited understanding of biology, Aristotle developed his theory of the 
differences of sex based on faulty science (especially with respect to the biological 
workings of reproduction), as well as the opinions of the day regarding men and women. 
As such, many of his observations as related to the philosophy of nature, and his general 
observations about the differing behaviors and roles that men and women play, led him to 
incorrect conclusions that rightly anger many in the feminist community. Such conclusions 
are a product of his era rather than holding any scientific truth. The challenge is to separate 
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Aristotle’s natural philosophy, which had basic facts of reproduction incorrect, from his 
logic and metaphysics, which still have much to contribute.  His metaphysics and logic 
constitute a framework on which someone could build an understanding of sex and gender. 
Charlotte Witt is such a person, and she attempts to do so with her theory of gender 
uniessentialism. 
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Chapter Three: Charlotte Witt and Gender Uniessentialism 
Charlotte Witt is the creator of a unique gender theory called gender 
uniessentialism.61 Witt explains her theory in her book Metaphysics of Gender. According 
to Witt, the need for such a theory comes from the fact that in every individual, there is an 
intuition that gender is somehow essential to the individual’s understanding of their own 
self-identity. Natalie Stoljar explains: 
Part of the motivation for defending gender essentialism is to explicate the 
centrality of gender in individuals’ own intuitions about their sense of self. 
Many people think that if their gender were to change, they would not be 
the same individual. . . . This suggests that gender is an essential property 
of individuals in at least some sense of the concepts “gender,” “individual,” 
and “essential.”62 
Witt’s position claims to use an Aristotelian metaphysical framework to build a 
gender theory that is an ontological theory, rather than a sociological or anthropological 
theory, as is common among many feminists. By using an Aristotelian framework, she 
takes a position that is unique among feminist gender theorists, presenting the claim that 
gender can be grounded metaphysically. Witt ultimately believes that this metaphysical 
accounting of gender is important because understanding gender in such a way will help 
advance the causes of the feminist community. 
Witt employs several terms within gender theory, some coming from Aristotle and 
others she creates. Witt also redefines some terms, or understands them differently than a 
traditional Aristotelian would understand the terms. It is vital for clarification to identify 
where she differs in her definitions from those of Aristotle. 
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3.1 Types of Essentialism 
Witt’s details her understanding of essence in another book, Substance and Essence 
in Aristotle: An Interpretation of Metaphysics VII-IX, which she uses as the foundation of 
her gender theory. Witt defines essence in two ways. The first way is essence in relation to 
kinds. Witt states that in this view, it is “a property that determines kind membership.”63 
Witt refers to this as “kind essentialism,”64 describing it as an essence which is “the 
determining factor constituting a grouping of individuals.”65 Aristotelians understand kind 
essentialism as referring to a universal, or secondary substance. Witt argues however, that 
essences are actually “substances and particulars, or individuals.”66  
Witt believes that essences are only individuals and then addressed the 
understanding of secondary substance. Witt argues that, while it is traditional to interpret 
Aristotle this way, she rejects the interpretation of essence as “universals that explain 
species membership.”67 Witt specifically believes that kind essentialism is mistaken on 
three accounts: 
First, it is wrong in holding that the most important function of form or 
essence is to explain species membership. . . . Second, the traditional 
interpretation mistakenly holds that the essence of an individual, composite 
substance is universal rather then [sic] individual. . . . Third, on my view, 
an essence is not a property (or a cluster of properties) of the substance 
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whose essence it is . . . no property (no Aristotelian property) can be the 
cause of being of an actual, individual substance.68 
She argues instead that “no universal can be substance or essence. Rather, the 
essence is the cause of the individual’s being and is as such individual in itself.”69 Witt also 
believes that an essence is not “a set of properties that necessarily belongs to an object 
throughout its existence,” and “[essences] are not properties (necessary or accidental) of 
sensible substances or of their constituent matter.”70 Witt rejects kind essentialism. 
Witt believes that there is another interpretation of essence, also Aristotelian, that 
she refers to as “individual essentialism.” Rather than kind essentialism, Witt argues that 
what Aristotle means by essence is individual:  
(i) the cause of there being an actual individual substance and (ii) the cause 
of its being a unity rather than a heap. That is to say, Aristotle’s primary 
interest in the question of what is responsible for the existence of an actual 
individual substance, rather than in the question of why we classify 
individual substances in the way that we do (i.e., into species).71 
Witt claims that this view is the correct general interpretation of essence. Witt understands 
essence as more connected with the understanding of an Aristotelian primary substance, 
the individual. She believes that individual essentialism divides into two different subtypes, 
“identity essentialism” and “uniessentialism.” 
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Identity essentialism, according to Witt, is the understanding of essence as 
explained by Kripke. It is defined as “what makes an individual be the individual it is.”72 
Kripke’s understanding asks what individual property is necessary to be that particular 
individual.73 Witt explains that Kripke’s understanding of essence deals with the identity 
of the individual. According to Witt: 
Kripke’s basic idea is to consider the properties of an object, (in this case, a 
lectern) and to reflect about those properties in relation to the identity of the 
object. Which properties are such that the lectern, if it lacked them, would 
not be this lectern? Those properties are the necessary or essential properties 
of the lectern. . . . The properties an object must have if it exists at all are 
the properties that, if the object did not have them, it would not be that very 
object.74 
One of many problems that Witt sees with identity essentialism is that: 
The radical individuality of essential properties of origin makes them 
unsuitable for inclusion in an Aristotelian essence . . . the individual forms 
or essences of two human beings could not be specified in a single definition 
that would specify both essences.75 
Witt also believes that Kripke’s essentiality of matter is problematic, stating that “Aristotle 
does not include matter in the definition of a composite substance; the definition, he holds, 
is a determination of the form and actuality.”76 Witt rejects identity essentialism. 
The second subtype of individual essentialism Witt labels uniessentialism. She 
makes the distinction within individual essentialism to avoid the critique of identity 
essentialism. She argues that in uniessentialism, “the essence is the cause of being of the 
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individual . . . more precisely, its essence causes these materials or parts to constitute a new 
individual substance rather than a heap of stuff or collection of parts.”77 Uniessentialism is 
“a theory about the unity of individuals, and it holds that individuals are unified and exist 
as individuals . . . by virtue of their essences.”78 
Witt argues that a uniessence is a functional property that explicates the existence 
of the particular individual, and answers the question “what is it?”79 Witt notes that while 
artifacts and biological individuals have a principle that explains their existence as 
individuals, she believes that the principle is a functional essence.80 This functional essence 
is “an essential property that explains what the individual is for, what its purpose is, and 
that organizes the parts towards that end.”81 Paul Gilbert describes uniessentialism as “the 
property which makes some individual thing into the thing it is, as, for instance, having the 
function of being a shelter for humans or animals makes various material parts into some 
individual house.”82  The question asked in this view is “what is it?”83 The answer to the 
question is its functional essence. 
Witt continuously uses an analogy of a house to describe uniessentialism, in that 
the parts of the house make up the whole, but that the functional essence of a house is to 
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provide shelter, and the disparate parts do not realize that function. In the analogy, she 
states that uniessentialism is a “theory about the ontological constitution of unified 
individuals, and it applies to any unified individual that is made up of parts, including 
artifacts, organisms, persons, agents, plays, God, and so on.”84 Uniessentialism is Witt’s 
understanding of essence. 
3.2 Human Organism, Person, and Social Individual 
Witt’s understanding of essence leads to the next distinction within her theory of 
gender uniessentialism, that of the ontological division of the human being. The crux of 
Witt’s theory of uniessentialism rests on her dissection of the human being into different 
ways of being, namely into a human organism, a person, and a new distinction called the 
social individual.85 She uses an example of her daughter Anna, who is adopted. Witt argues 
that if Anna were left in Vietnam, the two “Annas,” “Vietnamese Anna” and “American 
Anna,” while the same human organism, would not be the same person.86 Nor would they 
be the same social individual, because American Anna would have a different social role, 
such as adopted, or a minority – roles that Vietnamese Anna would not possess. 
3.2.1 Human Organism 
Witt defines a human organism as “individuals who are members of the human 
species and who realize the human genotype, or whatever other criteria are proposed to 
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define species membership,” and as such are subject to biological or functional 
normativity.87 
3.2.2 Person 
Witt defines the term “person” as “individuals who have a first-person perspective 
(or self-consciousness) and are characterized by the related property of autonomy.”88 She 
would argue that some members of the human species are not persons, using the example 
of a baby, as the baby lacks a first-person perspective and is not self-reflective.89 Mari 
Mikkola in her critique explains Witt’s definition of person “in terms of intrinsic 
psychological states of self-awareness and self-consciousness (i.e. the first person [sic] 
perspective)”90 A person is autonomous and has associated ethical normativity.91 
3.2.3 Social Individual 
Witt’s new addition, and what she claims makes her theory a metaphysical theory, 
is her understanding of a social individual. Witt defines social individuals as “those 
individuals who occupy social positions such as a parent, a professor, a contractor, or a 
refugee.”92 For Witt’s theory to work, it is critical that she establish the nature of the social 
individual as an ontological reality, distinct from both human organisms and persons. Later 
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in her argument, she will argue that human organisms and persons are not gendered, only 
social individuals are gendered.  
Social individuals, according to Witt, differ from both persons and human 
organisms, by way of their relation to social positions: 
Social individuals differ from both human organisms and persons because 
they are defined relationally as social position occupiers. Social individuals 
exist in relation to the social world and its network of social positions. Being 
a social individual is a relational status that is fixed by an individual’s social 
position occupancy.93 
She also states that “I distinguish social individuals from persons because the first-person 
perspective is an essential property of persons but not of social individuals, who are 
essentially social position occupiers.”94 She believes that not every member of the human 
species is a person, in that a person must have the ability of self-reflection.95 Some human 
organisms, such as babies or children, do not possess this power. While they are social 
individuals by virtue of their role as “child” or “student,” they are not fully capable persons. 
Witt argues that “persons and humans have different persistence and identity 
conditions,” using the example that while American Anna and Vietnamese Anna are the 
same human organism, they would be different persons.96 She argues that the same is true 
of the social individual: 
If the social world did not exist, then social individuals would not exist. 
Social individuals are essentially relational beings and their existence is 
dependent upon the existence of social reality. In contrast, to be a person is 
essentially to have a first-person perspective (or self-consciousness). . . . An 
individual person could exist independently of social reality because having 
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a first-person perspective does not require the existence of the social world, 
but a social individual could not exist independently of a set of social 
positions and roles.97 
Witt believes that a social individual has different persistence and identity conditions than 
the person (such as the requirement of a social reality). Therefore, a social individual is 
ontologically distinct from both a person and from a human organism. Each have a different 
manner of being. Human existence then, is a combination of human organism, person, and 
social individual, which Witt calls “the trinity.”98 
3.3 Ways of Being – Constitution Relationship 
Witt elaborates on how the human organism can constitute both the social 
individual and the person by explaining it in terms of a constitution relationship.99 The 
“Constitution View” was created by Lynne Rudder Baker. She describes it as: 
It is a relationship that may hold between granite slabs and war memorials, 
between pieces of metal and traffic signs, between DNA molecules and 
genes, between pieces of paper and dollar bills - things of basically different 
kinds that are spatially coincident.100 
 Witt bases her understanding on how both a social individual and a person can be 
constituted in a human organism on the constitution theory.101 Witt argues that the 
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constitution relationship explains how “three individuals [are] related to one another when 
they occupy the same place.”102 The constitution theory states that constitution is a relation 
of unity and not identity. Witt says that “when a human organism constitutes a person, the 
organism (the constituter) does not cease to exist, but the constituted thing is a person, a 
unified being, and not two or more beings.”103 
Witt argues that the constitution relationship allows for “branching,” a term that 
means that one object can constitute two different objects.104 Witt uses an example of a 
lump of clay, a statue, and a religious object as having different relations in social contexts, 
even though they share certain properties. 
3.4 Sex 
Witt does not define sex as explicitly as she does the other terms in her book. Nor 
does she believe that there is a clear “bright line” distinction between sex and gender or a 
direct one-to-one relationship.105  Witt uses the terms “male” and “female” when talking 
about biological sex.106  
On one hand, Witt believes that “there are empirical problems with thinking of sex 
difference as a biological matter. . . For one thing, there is good reason to doubt that sex 
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difference is based entirely on biological markers.”107 She argues that “it is a cultural, 
medical practice to bifurcate into two categories what is naturally more complex.”108 
On the other hand, she identifies that there are biological markers associated with 
being male and female, and with being intersexed, but it is important to recognize the 
cultural forces involved in categorizing all human animals as either male or female.109 
 Witt states that the human reproductive function can be seen from two 
perspectives. As a biological function, “human reproduction has a normative component. . 
. . This biological normativity is species based; it is as a member of the human species that 
our biological functions are fixed.”110 The other perspective is from a socially mediated 
function, where there is a second layer of normativity called social normativity. In that 
layer, “gendered social roles that are defined in relation to reproduction are not determined 
by species membership alone.”111 The sex of a human organism will have a role to play in 
gender, but it is not definitive. Witt argues that: 
While sexual morphology and other biological markers provide a basis for 
distinguishing male from female human beings (although not all humans 
are either male or female), it is not necessary that an individual satisfy the 
criteria for being male to be a man or the criteria for being female to be a 
woman.112  
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3.5 Gender 
Witt uses the terms “man” and “woman” for gender.113 She describes gender as “a 
pervasive and fundamental social position [emphasis mine] that unifies and determines all 
other social positions both synchronically and diachronically.”114 Witt’s view of gender is 
also that it provides the “principle of normative unity that organizes, unifies, and 
determines his or her other social roles [emphasis mine].”115 Natalie Stoljar describes 
Witt’s definition of gender: 
[Witt] proposes a definition of gender using what Witt calls the 
“engendering function”: [sic] “to be a woman is to be recognized as having 
a body that plays one role in the engendering function: women conceive and 
bear” (40). Thus on Witt’s analysis, being a woman is tied to the bodily 
aspect of being a female human—the biological function of conceiving and 
bearing children—but defined using criteria of social recognition. 
Therefore, the normativity that is appropriate to the notion of gender is 
social, not biological. A female human may not live up to biological norms 
when her childbearing function is impaired but may nevertheless live up to 
the social norms that are associated with a body whose function is 
childbearing (and vice versa).116 
What is unique about Witt’s theory is where in “the trinity” of the human being 
Witt attributes gender. Witt asserts that the social individual is gendered, and not the 
person, nor the human organism. A person, according to Witt, has no gender because a 
person is merely the first-person perspective of an individual human being. A person, 
therefore, is independent of cultural and social relations. Gender is a social role, and must 
be attributed to the social individual.  
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Witt argues that “gender is a social position and a social role,”117 and that “being a 
woman or being a man is a social position, and whether an individual is a woman or a man 
is determined by which engendering function that individual is recognized by others to 
have.”118 The consequence of this is that gender cannot be merely a matter of personal self-
identification. Witt proposes “to define the social position of being a woman and being a 
man in terms of the socially mediated reproductive (or engendering) functions that an 
individual is recognized (by others) to perform.”119 If society determines that a particular 
individual is a woman, it is because they have determined that her engendering function is 
to conceive and bear children. As noted above by Stoljar, there is a biological aspect to the 
determination of gender, the function; but it is defined in the context of a social role – that 
of a mother. If the biological function is damaged (i.e., the woman is unable to have 
children), the social role remains undisturbed (society still recognizes her engendered 
social position). 
Witt also believes that while there is a cultural aspect associated to gender, “part of 
what it means to be a woman or a man is to be recognized to have a certain kind of body 
that is linked to certain biological processes like reproduction.120 Witt states that:  
there is no plausible way of thinking about gender that is entirely detached 
from bodily, biological existence even if – as we have just seen – those 
biological processes, or sexual and reproductive functions, are complex and 
culturally mediated.”121 
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Witt states that “some feminists distinguish sex from gender by basing sex 
difference on biological criteria and gender difference on social and cultural criteria.”122 
However, she argues that this is overly simplistic on both accounts. Witt believes that the 
division of sex into male and female is made by anatomical, chromosomal, and hormonal 
criteria, often at birth. However, she believes that there are more than just two sexes, 
referencing hermaphroditism,123 and that it is a simplification to categorize humans into 
two sexes.124 She believes this categorization to be a cultural, medical practice rather than 
something more innate, even though she does not deny the biological markers associated 
with the male and female sex. 
3.6 Gender as the Sole Unifying “Mega Social Role” 
Witt, near the end of her argument, makes the further claim that gender is not 
merely one of many social positions or roles, but the sole unifying role that unifies all of 
the other social roles and serves as the foundational organizational principle of the social 
individual. Witt declares gender a “mega social role,” which “provides a principle of 
normative unity for social individuals.”125 Witt writes that “gender unifies the sum of social 
position occupancies into a new social individual.”126  
A social individual might occupy many different social roles at one time. What is 
needed is a role that “unifies her or him into a single individual, despite holding several 
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different social roles.”127 For example, an individual might be occupying the role of 
woman, mother, doctor, and friend all at the same time. All of these social roles have a set 
of social norms specific to each social role, and yet some might conflict with others. The 
mega social role is the role that takes precedence over and above any other social role that 
a social individual may occupy: “An individual agent requires an integrated or unified set 
of norms that tacitly or explicitly govern his or her social activity, perhaps prioritizing some 
normative requirements and minimizing others.” A mega social role acts as this unifier and 
prioritizes the various and disparate demands that any particular social role might make.  
Witt believes that gender is a social individual’s mega social role. According to 
Paul Gilbert, “one’s gender is the mega social role that gives normative unity to others and 
makes us the individuals we are.”128 While a social individual is evaluated on the basis of 
many social roles in society, the social individual is primarily evaluated by and responsive 
to the mega social role of gender. 
3.7 Witt’s Theory 
 Having defined and elaborated on Witt’s terminology, it is possible to see her 
theory in its entirety. Witt believes that uniessentialism is a “relational property that orders 
all of the individual parts into a functional unity,”129 which she refers to as a “uniessence.” 
For Witt, gender is the uniessence of a social individual; it is the relational and normative 
property that orders all of the other social roles. Gender is the unifying social role. Gender 
is the uniessence, the organizing principle, and the mega social role of a new ontological 
                                                 
127 Gilbert,  105. 
128 Ibid. 
129 Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender, 12. 
37 
 
concept called a “social individual.” Gender takes precedence and priority over any other 
social role a social individual may possess.  
She argues that a social individual is gendered. Social individuals are ontologically 
different from both persons and human organisms, yet they constitute one individual.130 
The flexibility in her position allows her to maintain a distinction between sex and gender, 
and also allows for a social individual to change their gender if the social individual 
undergoes a change which would modify the way the social individual is evaluated in 
society (such as a sex-reassignment surgery). Her theory thus allows for multiple genders 
because she believes there are more than two sexes, as evidenced by intersex and 
hermaphrodite individuals.131 
Finally, Witt attempts to correct misconceptions about her theory as well, arguing 
that other forms of essentialism (kind essentialism and identity essentialism) cannot explain 
gender adequately.132 The critiques that many feminists use do not apply to her version of 
uniessentialism, but to the other two types of essentialism. Witt argues that her theory 
avoids those pitfalls and better explains gender than the prevailing views, with the benefit 
of providing a metaphysical grounding of gender that feminism lacks.  
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Chapter Four: Analysis of Gender Uniessentialism 
Witt’s theory is unique in both the feminist and Aristotelian communities. 
Essentialism is largely an unacceptable position within the feminist community, and many 
feminists have a critical analysis of her theory. However, it is important to understand in a 
broader context the contemporary feminist position and how Witt’s theory relates to it.  
Biologically, Witt’s assertions about sex require further examination. Biology can 
explain a great deal about sexual difference and development. Using this knowledge, Witt’s 
theory can be evaluated further to determine if her understanding of sex opens itself to 
critique when considering how human biology works, as well as how it accounts for 
disorders of sexual development. 
Finally, within the Aristotelian community, her position of uniessentialism and 
gender is set within a broader debate of Aristotle’s philosophy. While Witt takes a 
uniessentialist approach, many others reject her position on the grounds that it rejects some 
of Aristotle’s principles. Instead, they prefer a traditional approach that includes kind 
essentialism. What would a gender theory grounded in a traditional Aristotelian 
understanding of essence look like?  
4.1 Feminist Gender Theory Dilemma 
Theodore Bach, a professor of philosophy at Bowling Green State University 
Firelands College, argues that feminist gender theory tends to fall into two positions, 
namely, cultural feminism and post-structuralist feminism.133 Cultural feminists “describe 
women as a real kind but claim that the essence of this kind has been obscured and devalued 
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by andro-centric cultural practices.”134 Post-structuralists, on the other hand, argue that 
“the very idea of a coherent category ‘woman’ is a myth that functions in the service of 
patriarchy.”135 Witt’s theory is unique in that it wants to affirm that gender is essential, yet 
allow for flexibility by attaching gender to the social individual. Various societies have 
various social norms which are subject to modification. Given this, it is possible to see that 
gender norms could change with society over time. Seemingly, Witt attempts to synthesize 
the two positions. 
These two positions are susceptible to critique by positing a dilemma that neither 
position seems to be able to answer adequately. The dilemma inherent in the two positions 
of feminist theory is that it leads to either accepting that there are normative consequences 
in accepting gender kinds, or else accepting the consequences of rejecting gender kinds.136  
For example, cultural feminism, by claiming that men and women are real kinds, 
have a problem in that they are “limited by their exclusion of prima facie [sic] women who 
fail to satisfy enough properties of the posited feminine essence.”137 In short, they cannot 
fail to exclude some women from the category138 of women. If gender is a natural kind, it 
inherently limits the freedom of the feminist movement to define femininity in the matter 
they desire as well. To avoid the dilemma, Witt and others employ essentialism to affirm 
that there is a category of women. They claim “the category ‘woman’ is defined by an 
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essential social property: women are real, but their unity is socially rather than biologically 
caused.”139 
By invoking an “essential social property,” two problems arise: The commonality 
problem and the representational problem. The commonality problem is fourfold, 
describing various issues of inseparability, universality, immutability, and normativity for 
which a social essentialist position cannot adequately account: 
1. Inseparability: Gender is not a feature that exists and develops 
independently of other (social) features such as race, class, and religion. 
2. Universality: There is simply no feature that all women of all times and 
places have in common. 
3. Immutability: By defining women according to property P it follows that 
(i) the elimination of P entails the elimination of women, (ii) if an individual 
possesses P at time 1 and loses P at time 2, then that individual is no longer 
a woman. 
4. Normativity: Defining women according to an essential property 
privileges those who possess this property, or who possess more of it, and 
marginalizes those who do not possess this property, or who do not possess 
enough of it.140 
Post-structuralism avoids the horn of the dilemma for which the cultural feminists 
must account because they reject essentialism. However, rejecting all essentialism leads to 
the second horn of the dilemma, the representational problem. The representational 
problem states “if there is no real group ‘women,’ then it is incoherent to make moral 
claims and advance political policies on behalf of women.”141 Post-structuralism results in 
a nominalist position which destroys the very grouping of “woman” for which feminists 
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are advocating. If they deny the category “woman,” then they are unable “politically to 
represent women.”142  
Both positions reject “biological essentialism” or “biologism,” which “ascribes an 
intrinsic essence to gender categories.”143 Biologism is rejected by feminists, including 
Witt, because biologism “has historically been placed in the service of misogynist agenda 
. . . the view is most commonly attacked on the grounds that it is empirically false and that 
it explains the social status of women as inevitable, necessary, and therefore justified.”144 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the dilemma within feminism. First, for any 
gender theory to be sound, it has to choose which horn to address and explain coherently. 
Second, both positions argue that biologism, because it has been put into the service of 
discrimination, is an unacceptable position. However, it would be wise to address the 
substance of the position rather than how people have misused it over the years. Any tool 
can be misused, especially in the political sense. Biologism should be evaluated in greater 
detail, and separated from how it was utilized in the past. 
4.2 Feminist Critiques of Witt 
One critique leveled by other feminists is that they reject any sort of gender 
essentialism. Some believe that essentialism is equivalent to biologism.145 Witt rejects this 
as she believes that gender is essential but tied to the social individual. She also denies the 
claim that “essentialism could only be true of natural or biological entities,” using an 
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example of persons such as angels, having no gender at all, to prove that persons are not 
necessarily gendered.146 
4.2.1 General Anti-Essentialist Critiques 
Witt believes that uniessentialism is better equipped to deal with several other 
arguments against essentialism by feminists, which she claims are all arguments that affect 
kind or identity essentialism, and not uniessentialism. Witt addresses three such arguments: 
the social construction argument, the exclusion argument, and the ontological argument.147 
She uses these arguments to distinguish her position from kind and identity essentialism, 
thus inoculating her theory from critique. 
The social construction argument, as Witt describes it, is motivated by the  feminist 
rejection of gender realism – the position that “men and women are kinds whose members 
share a defining property.”148 She states that “on the assumption that essences are 
biologically determined or natural and that gender is socially constructed and not 
biologically determined, an anti-essentialist position concerning concepts of gender 
follows.”149 Witt argues that her detractors “assume that only membership in natural kinds 
(like biological species) could be defined by a common property, because only natural 
kinds are stable and homogenous.”150 They claim that essentialism cannot be true because 
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features that would be used for classification into kinds are variable across both time and 
culture. 
The social construction argument leads to the exclusion argument. Essentialism, it 
is argued, results in excluding some men or women from their natural kind. Her detractors 
argue that due to essentialism using some attribute to effect the categorization of women, 
it would “necessarily marginalize and exclude some women by defining kind membership 
using properties that they do not have.”151 They also argue that “there are no, or no 
significant or interesting, features common to women across cultures.”152  
The ontological argument claims that “individual essentialism treats subjects as 
objects and leaves no room for individual choice and agency.”153 These detractors argue 
that essentialism, broadly speaking, 
runs counter to the correct view of the self as a subject that chooses, 
negotiates, rejects, or performs identities like gender . . . nothing makes (sic) 
the individual man or woman the individual that he or she is, because the 
identities and self-understandings that make up our social selves are chosen, 
negotiated, performed, rejected, and so on.154 
Common in all of these arguments is the question “of whether the social 
construction of gender categories is incompatible with gender essentialism.”155 Witt 
dismisses them as applying to identity and kind essentialism, but not to her position of 
uniessentialism. Against the social construction argument, she argues that “the fact that an 
individual, institution, or kind has a social origin or social definition does not in and of 
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itself rule out essentialism about that individual, institution, or kind.”156 Witt states that 
“kind essentialists mistake what is social and variable for what is natural and fixed,” and 
that her form of essentialism is not susceptible to this problem.157  
The exclusion argument fails because it applies only to kind essentialism, and not 
individual essentialism or uniessentialism. She also believes it to be a hasty generalization 
that would require some other theory which shows exclusion to be the result. Lastly, the 
ontological argument fails because it again does not apply to uniessentialism, but to identity 
essentialism.  
4.2.2 Witt-specific Feminist Critiques 
Witt’s theory has also been critiqued by several feminists. One such feminist is 
Professor Ann Cudd of the University of Kansas. Cudd believes that Witt gets many things 
right. She states that Witt “elucidates the tacitness of social norms, in a way that was 
reminiscent to me of Heidegger’s concept of thrownness.”158 However, she identifies four 
aspects of Witt’s theory that she finds to be problematic: social individuals, a social 
individual as redundant to a person, other candidates for the mega social role, and 
questioning the engendering function.159  
First, Cudd does not believe that a social individual is necessary. She takes issue 
with Witt’s argument that “the type of unity we need . . . is normative unity, and this means 
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it must be a social role that organizes the prioritization of all of the social roles that one 
individual occupies.”160 She replies: 
This seems to me to be contradicted by the example of the woman professor 
who is evaluable under both the norms of caring about and not caring about 
appearance. In Witt’s case it is the woman norm that rules. In my case it is 
the professor norm that rules: my question on the first day of class is always 
“What (the hell!) am I going to say?” . . . I think we put social norms on 
hold all the time, whenever we are not in the right context to be evaluable 
under that norm. … If I am right about the question of whether the social 
norm for worrying about appearance is put on hold when I am considering 
the more urgent question of what to say on the first day of class, then that 
means that gender is not unifying my other social norms. But if there is one 
norm that rules them all, then that norm cannot be put on hold, it must be 
either flouted or followed or blended with any other norm that is activated 
for one [emphasis mine].161 
Next, Cudd argues that there is no need for a unifying relation for social roles, and 
that the person could occupy the role rather than the social individual.162 Cudd continues 
her critique stating that in regards to Witt’s understanding of the person: 
Witt’s conception of the person is inadequate, and this is why persons on 
her conception cannot provide the principle of normative unity . . . reflection 
. . . is a normative practice that is enabled by language and other social 
norms, such as epistemic and practical reasoning norms.163 
Cudd believes that although Witt argues that persons are characterized by autonomy, 
“autonomy [is understood] in a relational way . . . [which] implies that it is a social 
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property.”164 For Cudd, this understanding of person removes the need to posit a social 
individual because “persons cannot exist entirely without society.”165 
Cudd also critiques the notion of mega social roles, arguing that “there would be 
other equally good candidates to gender for the exalted position.”166 She proceeds to make 
the argument that the social role of disability could qualify as a mega social role: 
As with gender, which Witt argues empirically affects how individuals are 
perceived in all their other social roles, being able-bodied positively affects 
one’s role as parent, professional, citizen, etc. . . . I would venture that it 
affects everything we do and how we are seen and classified by others at all 
times.167 
Cudd also argues that race is an equally compelling alternative to gender, refuting Witt’s 
argument that “racial categorization is not a cultural universal as gender is.”168 Cudd argues 
instead that:  
Race is simply the way categorization works in our society. . . .  But even if 
something like race or ethnicity is not a cultural universal, it is certainly 
highly salient for many societies of the world for a significant period of 
history to claim that it is now a mega social role.169 
Witt’s second objection against race is that “race is not connected to any central and 
necessary social function by definition in the way that gender is.”170 Cudd rejects this 
objection as well, arguing that: 
Gender does not have a definitional connection to such a function [a central 
and necessary social function], and that race has an equally close connection 
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to the function of work. After all, many women do not bear or raise children, 
and many men do not beget children.171 
Finally, Cudd argues that the engendering function described by Witt is not central 
to our lives. She recalls that in her life, prior to children, “The norms that govern 
childrearing and bearing were not significant for me in my late teens and twenties and are 
receding in normative significance for me [as I get older].”172 She also worries that “[the] 
claim that the engendering function is central to our lives is not falsifiable,” because “[there 
is] no simple empirical refutation of it.”173 
Witt replies to each of these concerns. With regard to the skepticism about social 
individuals, Witt argues if Cudd’s position is correct that she can set aside norms (such as 
that of a woman versus that of a professor), then: 
It would be a mystery why aspiring women philosophers even have to worry 
about what to wear for an APA interview besides the basics . . . if I am right 
then social roles are less like discrete items on a buffet table and more like 
a soup or stew with intermingled and mutually inflecting ingredients. And 
we are not the cooks.174 
Regarding a misunderstanding about person, Witt argues that Cudd misunderstands 
her position. Cudd argues that Witt describes a person primarily as autonomous, a position 
Witt does not hold. Rather, Witt argues that her view of persons describes them “as 
necessarily having a first person [sic] perspective or being capable of self-reflection,” and 
that persons are “not essentially social position occupiers”175 In terms of autonomy, she 
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argues that “I don’t think that Cudd’s view of autonomy gives us any additional reason to 
think that persons are essentially social in the sense of essentially social role occupiers.”176 
On the critique of mega social roles, Witt grants that Cudd may be right in that 
gender may not be the only candidate for the mega social role.177 Witt does not address 
Cudd’s arguments for race as a social mega role. However, with regards to disability, she 
describes it as “gappy,” in the sense that it is a relatively new social category and that there 
are various types of differing lengths and severities of disability.178 Due to this 
inconsistency, she dismisses it, stating that: 
It is difficult to see how there could be a social role of disability with a set 
of norms that could perform the prioritizing function of the mega social role. 
It seems to make more sense to think that disability refers to many different 
social roles with many different norms.179 
Finally, on engendering as central to our lives, Witt states that the issue is not 
whether women are “obsessing about children,” but rather that “the engendering function 
an individual is recognized to have establishes his or her gender.”180 She argues that 
regardless of the fact whether women decide to have children or not, the functional 
specification of gender is normative, not descriptive.181  
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4.3 Witt’s Sex and Gender Distinction 
Witt, along with other feminist gender theorists, believes that there is a distinction 
between biological sex and gender. While Aristotelians could hold that gender is socially 
constructed, they would also argue that sex is grounded in a biological reality, and that 
gender is informed by the cognition of sexual difference. Witt makes several assertions 
about sex that should be examined. 
Witt states near the beginning of her argument that she believes there are more than 
two biological sexes.182 She implies through her citations of Alice Dreger183 that 
hermaphrodites and intersex individuals are additional sexes. She also cites Anne Fausto-
Sterling to bring in gender politics and how sex is ultimately socially constructed.184 
However, Witt also believes that human reproduction is a biological function, where “the 
biological normativity is species based; it is as a member of the human species that our 
biological functions are fixed.”185 
4.3.1 Biological Understanding of Sexual Difference 
Ryan Anderson in his book When Harry became Sally: Responding to the 
Transgender Movement, makes an argument for understanding sex as a biological reality. 
Anderson argues that “our genetic code determines our sexed body,” explaining that “sex, 
in terms of male or female, is identified by the organization of the organism for sexually 
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reproductive acts.”186 He also states that “the conceptual distinction between male and 
female based on reproductive organization provides the only [emphasis mine] coherent 
way to classify the two sexes.”187 Anderson cites Lawrence Mayer and Paul McHugh, 
doctors from John Hopkins University, who argue that: 
In biology, an organism is male or female if it is structured to perform one 
of the respective roles in reproduction. . . . . Different animals have different 
reproductive systems, but sexual reproduction occurs when the sex cells 
from the male and female of the species come together to form newly 
fertilized embryos. It is these reproductive roles that provide the conceptual 
basis for the differentiation of animals into the biological categories of male 
and female. There is no other widely accepted biological classification for 
the sexes [emphasis mine].188 
The sexual distinction is biologically dimorphic in that “males are organized to 
engage in sexual acts that donate genetic material, while females are organized to engage 
in sexual acts that receive genetic material and then gestate the resulting offspring.”189 In 
other words, sex in mammals (and thus in humans) is the male-female relational 
actualization of the inherent power to reproduce. There are no other sexual organs found 
in the human species, and as a result, there are only two biological sexes within the human 
species. This bifurcation into male and female holds for human beings as it does for any 
species in the genus of mammal. As Anderson argues, “this really isn’t that controversial. 
Sex is understood this way across species.”190  
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A man, or male, is the mode of a human being who has the sexual organ (penis) 
responsible for injecting half of the genetic material (semen) into the woman. In traditional 
terms, a man has the reproductive faculty of begetting offspring. A woman or female is the 
alternative mode of being with a different sexual organ (vagina) which receives the genetic 
material of the male, providing the other half of the genetic material (within the ovum) 
necessary for procreation. Stated biologically, a woman has the reproductive faculty of 
conceiving and bearing. 
Anderson describes how the sex distinction begins. During conception, the sperm 
fertilizes the ovum, conception occurs, and an embryo is formed. Sex is determined 
genetically at conception, through the contribution of either an X or Y chromosome by the 
sperm that fertilizes the ovum. The presence of the Y chromosome (which contains the 
“SRY,” or “sex-determining Region on Y”) begins a series of hormonal events within the 
embryo.191 The Y chromosome directs the creation of testicles in males during fetal 
development. The absence of the Y chromosome directs the formation of the female 
reproductive anatomy.192  
Witt’s position, that there are more than two sexes, seems problematic in light of 
Anderson’s refutation of the notion of three or more sexes. In the reproductive act, there 
are only two types of gametes – the sperm and the ovum. There is no third gamete necessary 
for reproduction, nor does one exist.193 Witt argues that gender is determined by the 
engendering function that an individual is socially recognized to have: men beget and 
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women gestate, carrying a child to term. In this sense, Witt acknowledges that gender is 
linked to sex. However, sexual difference is determined by way of the reproductive power 
of the particular human couple. If there is to be a third gender, it would seem that it must 
be linked to a particular power of reproduction. Therefore, for her theory to admit a third 
gender, Witt would require an additional sex (other than male and female). If such a third 
sex could be defined, then a third gender could be “engendered” to that particular power of 
reproduction. If a third sex does not exist, then no third gender could exist. 
4.3.2 Categorizing Sexual Disorders 
Witt argues that one of her reasons for believing there are more than two biological 
sexes is that sometimes during fetal development, mutations occur that result in intersex or 
hermaphrodite individuals. These abnormalities can be explained with an understanding of 
biology and the formation of fetuses in the womb. For example, science explains several 
medical conditions that result in the deformation of the sexual organs, or the formation of 
female sex organs in an XY male (and vice versa). Often these abnormalities come about 
for a variety reasons, most of which involve the presence or absence of testosterone during 
the fetal development of the sexual organs.194 These abnormalities result in confusion after 
the child is born, sometimes resulting in the misidentification of sex, or raise ethical and 
moral dilemmas in the treatment of these individuals. 
However, accidents of nature or deformities during fetal development do not 
change the fundamental biological understanding of the human being. Disorders of sexual 
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development (DSD) are exceedingly rare, occurring once every 5,000 births.195 Nor do 
these individuals comprise a new sexual difference. As Anderson argues, “male and female 
organisms have different parts that are functionally integrated for the sake of their whole, 
and for the sake of a larger whole – their sexual union and reproduction.”196Anderson 
continues, stating that although “chromosomal and hormonal pathologies can disrupt and 
prevent normal development . . . activists want to recast all such abnormalities as only 
‘differences,’ in effect normalizing disorders.”197 He challenges the notion that a disorder 
could potentially be a third sex: 
People with DSDs do not constitute a third sex. Rather, DSDs are a 
pathology in the development and formation of the male or female body. 
This is the consensus view of medical experts who study and treat DSDs 
[emphasis mine].198  
Philosophically speaking, a sexual disorder would be accidental, such as the 
disorder of blindness in the eye. Hermaphrodites and intersex individuals are victims of a 
birth defect or accident during fetal development.199 Such causes include “genetic 
mutations, hormonal influences, the formation of a chimera or mosaic as an early embryo, 
or chromosomal abnormalities at fertilization.”200 
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Secondly, the human species is a member of the genus “mammals.” All mammals 
exhibit a sperm-egg reproductive system, and as such, all mammals are classified as either 
male or female. The reproductive aspect of mammals is not accidental. It is a necessary 
property of being a mammal. Witt does not explain nor provide evidence of how a species 
such as human beings are radically different from the genus in which it is contained. Given 
Witt’s position, it seems that she argues that the species Homo sapein is materially distinct 
from every other species in the animal genus, having the possibility of more than two sexes. 
Witt is unclear in this regard, and must explain how a species within a two-sexed genus 
has the potential for a third sex, when sexual reproduction is a necessary property of the 
genus in question, and applies to every species within the genus. 
4.4 Kind Essentialism vs. Uniessentialism 
Witt’s position of uniessentialism was developed in Chapter Three. To summarize, 
Witt built her theory of gender uniessentialism on her understanding of what Aristotle 
meant by the concept “essence.” Witt describes her position of uniessentialism as 
conceptually different than that of kind essentialism: 
I think that individual and kind essentialism are conceptually independent 
of one another. According to one interpretation of Aristotelian essentialism, 
however, the species form (e.g., the property of rationality) is both what 
grounds species or kind membership and [sic] what is essential to the 
existence of each individual (Spelman, 1988, Stoljar 1995, Alcoff 2006). 
This is not my interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of form and essence (Witt 
1989), [emphasis mine] but it is a common and traditional understanding of 
his view.201 
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Witt continues by stating that a uniessence of a particular thing “explains the 
existence of the new individual as a unity and not just a sum of material parts.”202 She 
thinks that an understanding of essence as in an individual (and in her theory, gender being 
the essence of a social individual) allows her to develop an Aristotelian model that can 
explain gender ontologically. 
4.4.1 Overview of the Aristotelian Debate 
Witt bases her theory of uniessentialism in Aristotle by way of an inconsistency in 
the use of Aristotle’s language. Previously in Chapter Two, Aristotle speaks of essence and 
substance as: 
That which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual 
man or the individual horse. The species in which the things primarily called 
substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the genera of 
these species. For example, the individual man belongs in a species, man, 
and animal is a genus of the species; so these – both man and animal – are 
called secondary substances.203 
Aristotle’s definition of essence is not altogether clear204  because in Metaphysics Z, 
Aristotle questions whether: 
Each thing and its essence are the same or different. This is of some use for 
the inquiry concerning substance; for each thing is thought to be not 
different from its substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of 
each thing.205 
Aristotle continues, stating that: 
                                                 
202 Ibid., 30. 
203 Aristotle, “Categories,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 1b 
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204 Lucas Angioni, “Things Are the Same as Their ‘Essences?’ Notes on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z-
6,” Analytica 16, no. 1 (2012). 
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Each thing then and its essence are one and the same in no merely accidental 
way . . . because to know each thing, at least, is to know its essence, so that 
even by the exhibition of instances it becomes clear that both must be one206 
Aristotle concludes: “Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsisting thing is one and the 
same as its essence.”207  
In Categories, Aristotle states: 
Being (οὐσία), in the true, primitive, and strict meaning of this term, is that 
which neither is predicable of a subject, nor is present in a subject 
[emphasis mine]; it is, for instance, a particular horse or a particular man. 
[emphasis mine]208  
These differences between Metaphysics and Categories is the cause of great debate within 
the Aristotelian community. Some believe that they are mutually refuting, while others 
believe the differences can be reconciled.209 Witt agrees with the former assertion; it is the 
foundation for her theory. 
4.4.2 Etienne Gilson’s Argument 
Etienne Gilson summarized how he comprehends the debate in Being and Some 
Philosophers. Gilson understands the distinction between essences as traditionally 
understood. He first explains Aristotle’s position using an example of “manness:” 
Manness then is not a property that belongs in certain subjects; rather, it is 
a characteristic which can be ascribed to those subjects. “Man” is what can 
be “said of” any actually given man. Let us call “predicability” this 
particular property. . . . “Manness” and “stoneness” do not exist in 
themselves; they only represent what I can truly ascribe to real “men” or to 
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209 Michael Wedin is one Aristotelian who believes the controversy can be resolved, stating “The 
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real “stones;” so much so that to turn them into real beings would be to 
repeat Plato’s mistake. It would be to substitute Ideas for actual realities.210  
Once Gilson has predicability defined, he then argues: 
in our sensible experience, which is the only one we have, the most striking 
indication we have that a certain substance is there is the operations it carries 
. . . we first detect substances by what they do. Let us call “nature” any 
substance conceived as the intrinsic principle of its own operations. All true 
substances are natures211 [emphasis mine].212 
Gilson recognizes the inconsistency of what he has just stated: “having reached this 
point, Aristotle had to stop, leaving his doctrine open to every possible interpretation and 
misinterpretation.”213 Gilson argues that Aristotle’s problem is a misunderstanding of the 
verb “to be:” 
The primary mistake of Aristotle as well as of his followers, was to use the 
verb “to be” in a single meaning, whereas it actually has two. If it means 
that a thing is, then individuals alone are, and forms are not; if it means what 
a thing is, then forms alone are and individuals are not. The controversy on 
the being of universals has no other origin than the failure of Aristotle 
himself to make this fundamental distinction.214 
While beyond the scope of this thesis to investigate further, Gilson believes that the answer 
to the problem is existence:  
Thus, the world of Aristotle is made up of existents without existence. They 
all exist, otherwise they would not be beings; but, since their actual 
existence has nothing to do with what they are, we can safely describe them 
as if they did not exist. Hence the twofold aspect of his own work.215 
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4.4.3 Witt’s Theory of Essence 
The inconsistency identified by Gilson is what has led scholars down through the 
ages to debate what Aristotle ultimately meant by essence. Witt creates her theory of 
essence on the very problem stated above. Ultimately, the three historical positions are 
moderate realism, conceptualism, and nominalism.216  In sum, Witt is tackling the medieval 
problem of universals. Witt’s position resurrects the debate specifically with regards to 
gender. If gender is essential, then in what way? As her theory is based on essences existing 
only in the individual, Witt argues that gender is essential to the social individual – it is the 
social individual’s uniessence. It is not an essence found in a kind (she rejects kind 
essentialism). However, it is also not merely a label. She states that it is somehow grounded 
in biology (even if to her the biology is not a simplistic bifurcation of sex) even though it 
is ultimately socially mediated.217 
If essence is only individual, her argument raises several questions: if she does not 
believe that essences are universals, how does she explain species? What makes one 
species different than another? What is a universal? It is not clear what she would say a 
universal is, if anything. From the historical point of view, if she rejects the realist position 
on universals, her remaining choices are either nominalism, akin to social constructionist 
feminists, or conceptualism, akin to William of Ockham or Abelard.218  
Witt’s understanding of essence without the understanding of it as a universal 
secondary substance is intriguing and requires further analysis and critique. It is a vital 
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component of her gender theory. She appears to be a conceptualist; if this is so, other 
Aristotelians could critique her position on gender by attacking the underlying theory of 
essence and of universals. The way that she grounds gender as a uniessence is a novel use 
of the principle of essence. It serves as a different perspective for the Aristotelian 
community to consider. The position should be compared and contrasted with an 
alternative approach that accepts both primary and secondary substances.  
4.5 Thomistic Alternative: Gender Theory of John Finley 
John Finley has developed an Aristotelian and Thomistic theory of gender that 
serves as an example of a traditional defense of sex and gender. It is an advancement of the 
historical understanding of Aristotle’s notion of essence. Finley has an elegant solution that 
is simpler in its ontology (it does not require an ontological social individual) and maintains 
the normative biological understanding of sex and gender.219 The term “gender” for Finley 
is used differently than Witt:  
I here use the term ‘gender’ to refer to the biological, sexual structures, and 
capacities in virtue of which humans have been traditionally referred to as 
male or female. Although the field of gender studies has often invoked the 
‘sex/gender’ distinction, I do not intend my use of the term ‘gender’ to 
coincide with this distinction’s notion of gender as subjectively or culturally 
constituted personal identity, distinct from biological structure.220 
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In his article, Finley seeks to offer a philosophic account of gender in its metaphysical 
structures.221  He determines that “being male or female, while properly characterizing the 
composite human individual, stems primarily from the soul.”222 
Finley first evaluates St. Thomas Aquinas’ position on sex. Sex for Aquinas is a 
type of accident. However, he refers to male and female as properties as well. Sex is 
classified as an inseparable accident, “adhering to particular human beings in lasting 
fashion.”223 Gender is identical to sex and results from the principles of the individual 
through permanent causation, distinguishing gender from separable accidents that have 
temporary causation, such as the ability to sit or stand. Finley then asks from what principle 
does gender originate in individual human beings: 
Thomas addresses this question in chapter 6 of De ente, while articulating a 
more metaphysical classification of accidents. Because substances like 
humans are composed of form and matter as principles, certain accidents 
follow from (consequuntur) form while others follow from matter.224 
As Finley further explains accidents as related to form and matter, in Aquinas’ third 
distinction, he finds a case for gender; Aquinas holds it as an accident of matter: 
So, third, among accidents following from matter some relate to a special 
form (formam specialem); thus masculine and feminine follow from matter, 
but precisely in relation to the form of “animal.” A sign of this connection 
is that once the form of animal has departed, gender properly speaking no 
longer remains, just as an eye of a corpse is called an eye only 
equivocally.225 
Finley argues that: 
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Thomas’s account holds that gender is an inseparable accident following 
from matter, though only present when a “special form” – an animal form 
– is present. . . . Thomas gives two reasons for assigning gender’s origin to 
matter rather than to form. One reason is grounded in the difference in the 
activity of the two genders; the other reason is grounded in their shared 
essence, or species.226 
Finley believes that both Aristotle and Aquinas come to the conclusion that gender 
is an accident of matter (and that both were mistaken) because: 
contemporary biology has shown that the female reproductive abilities are 
not imperfect versions of the male abilities. Man and woman do not, 
respectively, supply the active, formal principle of generation and the 
passive, material principle of generation.16 That a man’s production of 
semen and a woman’s ovulation each supply distinct elements of the 
offspring’s genetic material reveals that in this capacity the two are co-
contributors to the offspring. . . .17 Thus, Thomas’s empirical reason for 
assigning gender’s origin to matter (his first reason, mentioned above) is no 
longer tenable.227  
Finley proceeds to show how an accounting of gender (i.e. sex) flows from an 
inseparable accident of the soul, arguing “the presence of an organ indicates a particular 
configuration of matter for the sake of one of the soul’s powers, which in turn flows from 
the essence of the soul.”228 He continues: “The soul itself arranges material structures as 
organs so that they might fittingly serve as means through which the soul’s various powers 
can operate effectively.”229 
Finley concludes: 
Hence gender is not a characteristic in or of the soul, as though the soul 
could be considered a substance in its own right with this particular 
accident. Instead, like sensation, gender is a characteristic of the composite 
substance, stemming from the soul. . . . Hence we can provisionally locate 
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gender, with sensation, in the category of accidents that stem from form and 
have a share in matter.230 
Finley’s article is helpful because it is an example of an Aristotelian advancement 
in gender theory concerning the essence of accidents. While neither Aristotle nor Aquinas 
believed that being male or female stems from the form of an animal, the advancement that 
Finley proposes does no harm to the foundational elements of essence, form, and matter as 
traditionally understood. 
If Finley is correct in attributing gender (i.e. sex) to form rather than merely to 
matter, gender would have a different metaphysical foundation – the uniessence or 
substantial form of the human being. As such, there would be no need for Witt’s ontological 
invention of the social individual. She could abandon the constitution-without-identity 
theory of the human individual and retain a fully Aristotelian anthropology which preserves 
the unity of the human organism with its personhood and sex. The social aspects of Witt’s 
theory could possibly be subsumed into a sociological account of gender as a socially 
cultivated accident (role) based in human cognition of sexual difference. Witt’s insights 
could then be used to explain the human being’s uniessence in relation to society, rather 
than society enforcing or creating normative genders.   
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Chapter Five: Conclusion 
Charlotte Witt’s gender theory seeks to answer two questions which she asked at 
the beginning of The Metaphysics of Gender: 1) “Are there any properties that define 
membership in the kind woman or the kind man?”  and 2) “Would you be the same 
individual if you were gendered differently?”231 Her theory attempts to answer these 
questions, and she believes that current theories of gender within the feminist community 
lack a sufficient answer to either or both questions. Witt’s theory introduces a possible 
uniting of a traditional feminist understanding of gender with an essentialist grounding that 
provides a sure foundation. Does Witt make her argument? Many on either side would 
answer “no.” 
5.1 Biological Concerns 
Biologically, Witt’s position relies on other feminist research on sex, as noted 
above in Chapter Four. Her position that even sex is socially mediated runs counter to 
empirical data, and, outside of her metaphysical views, is the most troubling aspect of her 
theory. Due to her consideration of sex, she is unable to make a “bright line distinction . . 
. between what is natural/biological and what is cultural in relation to the distinction 
between sex and gender.”232 Her argument that, given different sexual disorders, there 
could be a third sex appears to be invalidated by the majority of the medical community. 
Philosophically, her argument runs counter to a traditional understanding of species. It 
warrants the explanation of how disorders of sexual development - accidents - result in a 
new sexual forms. Why could she not consider disorders such as those who are intersex 
                                                 
231 Witt, The Metaphysics of Gender, 3. 
232 Ibid, 36. 
64 
 
and hermaphrodites as disabilities related to reproduction? They would then be accidental 
to the human organism and would not constitute new species of sex. Should she adopt the 
traditional view of sex as dimorphic, her engendering functions could easily be lined up 
with their biological counterparts. 
5.2 Feminist Concerns 
From the traditional feminist perspective, most feminists reject any sort of 
essentialism, choosing a nominalist position instead. For them to accept that gender is 
somehow essential to the person, even to the social individual, would deny the fluidity 
needed within the broader political context. If gender were socially normative and 
ascriptive, it could potentially be an attack on the transgender community. It would not 
permit the individual to choose precisely who they are. The traditional feminist view runs 
counter to Witt’s understanding of the person as only the capacity for first-person 
reflection. Inherent in the transgender community’s understanding of gender is the ability 
to choose.  
In the Introduction to this thesis, a court case amicus brief was cited that described 
gender as “a person’s inner sense of belonging to a particular gender.”233 Witt’s position 
undermines the concept of gender as an inner sense. In Witt’s view, society defines gender, 
not the individual. In fact, Witt’s theory could support those defending a traditional 
understanding of gender. As previously cited, “While aiming to replace sex with gender 
identity, Gavin [the plaintiff] insists on access to the male facilities that exist only because 
the public acknowledges the meaningfulness of bodies that she denies have meaning 
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[emphasis mine].”234 Witt’s position would argue that this is true – society determines the 
social roles, and the social roles are normative, whether or not the individual in question 
agrees with them. Of course, Witt does believe that existing social roles are typically unjust 
and must be opposed in principle.  
Witt also disagrees with Cudd’s theory of disability being a possible mega social 
role. Witt argues that Cudd’s assertion is problematic, because of the difficulties in 
categorizing disabilities. Besides the many types of disabilities, others differ in their 
duration. Blindness could either be temporary or permanent, and individuals could be born 
with blindness or acquire it at some point in their life. The severity of a disability differs 
from one individual to the next as well. These reasons, according to Witt, make it a poor 
choice for the mega social role. However, gender in Witt’s conception allows for the same 
problems, if in fact there could be more than two genders. If an exponential increase in the 
types of recognized genders were allowed, would not the result be the same “gappiness” 
that Witt argues against with respect to disability? 
5.3 Aristotelian Concerns 
Aristotelians would object to the notion that her theory is “remarkably clear,” as 
Cudd declares. Aside from directly critiquing her understanding of essentialism and the 
constitution view of the human person, several questions remain. Witt claims that Aristotle 
would not include common matter in a definition of a composite substance; yet, Aristotle 
defines man as “rational animal.” Does that not include matter in the definition?235 Further, 
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Witt often equivocates in her terminology. She uses terms such as essence, category, 
relation, accident, property, and necessity liberally throughout her book. To Aristotelians, 
those terms mean something more than just descriptive attributes. It can be challenging to 
identify in what context she uses those terms; does she use them in an Aristotelian sense, 
or in a modern sense? 
As an example, Witt uses the term “relation” to describe gender, but then argues 
that gender is an identity constituted by the human organism. To Aristotelians, relation is 
an accident, and one’s rationality and sexuality are inseparable from one’s identity, but 
one’s social roles are not. What Witt calls “person” is the actualization of an inherent 
rational power of the human organism. What she calls “gender” is a socially cultivated 
accident based in a rational knowledge of biology. If gender exists in relation to a social 
determination of what it means to be a man or a woman, then is it not an accident? But for 
Witt, it cannot be an accident of a human organism. She fragments the human individual 
into three distinct identities and invokes constitution relation. 
 Further, an understanding of person as an identity distinct from that of a human 
being would have serious ramifications for Aristotelians. It could be argued that her theory 
has a unity problem that the hylomorphic view can solve, but the constitution view cannot. 
Her theory also results in severe moral and ethical consequences, especially with regard to 
understanding person as an identity separable from the organism and its sex. Does a human 
organism that lacks personhood have any rights? If so, when do those rights begin? When 
do they end? Is a person in a vegetative state still a person? Do they continue to have a 
right to life or to medical care? Witt already rejects that babies are persons. By that reading, 
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it would seem to imply that abortion should be morally permissible.236 It would be helpful 
to see Witt’s theory in light of these and many other ethical concerns – not merely the 
ethical concerns surrounding the feminist movement. 
Ultimately, most Aristotelians would argue that Witt needs to accept the traditional 
understanding of essence, both uniessentialism and kind essentialism. In doing so, sex 
would be regarded as inseparable from the person, as a composite of matter and form. An 
Aristotelian can admit that gender is a socially generated and sustained role but must also 
affirm that is informed by human nature and ultimately by human happiness. Witt would 
need to grant this in her theory in order to provide a teleological explanation of the essential 
social structure of gender that is apparent in all cultures.237 
As the philosophical debate about sex and gender rages on, at the heart of the debate 
seems to be a desire to project the self onto reality rather than to understand reality as an 
objective fact. An Aristotelian philosophy is one that seeks to determine reality not as a 
projection of the mind, but rather by a realization of the truth in concrete reality. Witt has 
some keen insights on how a culture or society views gender and how it plays a prominent 
role in social organization and relations. Her theory contributes significantly to an issue 
that will only face greater scrutiny as time moves forward. It will require further study, 
clarification, and investigation to ultimately determine its overall value and significance, 
but Witt’s contributions should not be underestimated, even as the dispute continues.  
                                                 
236 Given that the feminist movement is strongly pro-choice, this would not be a shocking assertion. 
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